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ABSTRACT 
Electricity infrastructure is considered a critical infrastructure for the UK, vital to economic 
prosperity. Current and future changes to the built environment, and the way we use 
electricity, will increasingly impact on local electricity infrastructure. Understanding the 
interaction between the built environment and electricity infrastructure is the focus of this 
paper. Infrastructure can be seen as comprising the physical network, carriers, conversion and 
storage facilities as well as governance, management and control systems needed to meet 
functional and social objectives. Studies have considered the nature of interdependency 
between infrastructures to be geographical/spatial, physical, functional, cyber/informational, 
logical, mutual or shared elements, resources/inputs, policy, market, budgetary and economic. 
Infrastructure can be represented using graph, or network, models. A node, or vertex, 
represents a physical element of the infrastructure, connected to one another by edges. Graph 
models have been used previously to consider, for example, disruption to resource flows as a 
result of natural hazard damage, interdependencies between gas and electricity infrastructure, 
and vulnerability of electricity infrastructure. Building on this previous work, graph theory is 
used to analyse the interaction between the built environment and the electricity infrastructure 
when considering the impact of energy efficiency retrofit of domestic properties. These 
interactions are identified through interviews with energy efficiency retrofit stakeholders. 
These interactions are then represented in a simple graph theory model.  
 
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
The electricity sector worldwide is facing considerable pressure arising out of climate change 
issues (Eyre and Baruah, 2011), depletion of fossil fuels (Ipakchi and Albuyeh, 2009) and 
geo-political issues around the location of remaining fossil fuel reserves (Coaffee, 2008). 
Electricity systems are also facing technical issues of bi-directional power flows, increasing 
long-distance power flows and a growing contribution from fluctuating generation sources. 
There is a concern that these systems are vulnerable.  
In order for the UK to meet targets for reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, future energy 
scenarios include:  
 decarbonisation of heating energy demand through reduced use of gas-fired boilers 
and increased use of technologies such as solar thermal and air source heat pumps; 
 decarbonisation of transport energy demand through reduced use of internal 
combustion engines and increased use of electric vehicles (EVs), plug-in hybrid 
electric vehicles (PHEVs) and fuel cell vehicles; 
 increased use of small scale electricity generation technologies such as photovoltaics. 
Changes to the way in which we light, power and heat our built environment infrastructure 
will lead to pressures on the electricity system. The purpose of the work presented here is to 
better understand the vulnerability of electricity systems within this context. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Robustness of electricity systems is seen as a problem requiring multidisciplinary study, with 
a key challenge to accurately model feedbacks for electricity systems (Brummitt et al., 2013), 
in order to better understand and avoid situations like that in India in July 2012, where more 
than 600 million people were left without power over two days (Esselborn). Even relatively 
small power failures have knock on effects due to the way our infrastructures are linked. For 
example, power failure at Clapham Junction, London in April 2015 left over 900 people 
stranded on trains for up to 5 hours. 
Investigations of electricity system vulnerability have focussed on shocks to the system 
associated with weather risks, equipment failure, supply (fuel) failure and price shocks, and 
analysis has been primarily based on financial measures such as the value of lost load 
(Chaudry et al., 2009). Whilst N-1 remains the measure of security of supply for the UK 
electricity system, a recent report on the system’s resilience (Bell et al., 2014) argues this N-1 
approach does not reflect current and future challenges to the system. These challenges were 
described as (a) closure of aging assets; (b) decarbonisation of electricity to meet greenhouse 
gas reduction targets; (c) climate change impacts.  
HM Treasury describe drivers of change for UK infrastructure as: obsolescence, globalisation 
and competition, growing demand and expectations, climate change, and interdependency 
(Treasury, 2010). They consider energy (along with digital communications, water and 
waste) to be a critical infrastructure which contributes to UK economic prosperity. For the 
UK, the management of critical infrastructure such as electricity is complicated by the 
challenge of dealing with infrastructure in private ownership. Operation and management of 
critical infrastructures involves a greater number of actors, with increased splintering of 
management and development responsibility, as a result of privatisation and restructuring 
policies (de Bruijne and van Eeten, 2007). The tension of infrastructure management is not 
only between public and private parties. Case studies of Boston (USA) and Cambridge (UK) 
indicated different government priorities at the national, regional and local level. This 
fragmented political geography resulted in (national and regional) economic development 
policies which were instigated to attract private investment in industry which were not 
appropriately funded to deliver on consequential increased (local) demands for infrastructure 
and service (Jonas et al., 2010). 
Infrastructure can be seen as comprising the physical network, carriers, conversion and 
storage facilities as well as governance, management and control systems needed to meet 
function and social objectives (Herder et al., 2008). Studies have considered the nature of 
interdependency between infrastructures to be geographical/spatial, physical, functional, 
cyber/informational, logical, mutual or shared elements, resources/inputs, policy, market, 
budgetary and economic (Bloomfield et al., 2009, Kjølle et al., 2012, Holden et al., 2013, 
Ouyang et al., 2009b). Economic and political issues were found to be particular indicators of 
failure for mega projects, for example (Van de Graaf and Sovacool, 2014).  
Much of the case study work on infrastructure interaction has been based on natural and man 
made disaster impacts. Studies of the performance of infrastructure after the World Trade 
Centre attacks indicated the importance of resilience, robustness and redundancy in recovery 
(Little, 2003). Cascade failure resulted from building damage, with a ruptured water main 
flooding underground train tunnels and impacting firefighting efforts. In addition, debris 
damaged nearby buildings which led to telecoms disruption over a wide area, including the 
New York stock exchange (O'Rourke, 2007).  
The physical and social structures of the energy infrastructure can be represented using 
network, or graph, models. A node, or vertex, represents a physical element of the 
infrastructure, connected to one another by edges. A balance equation can be described for 
each node, comprising inflow, outflow, production, consumption, storage, and discharge 
components. A review of graph theory for electrical system analysis (Pagani and Aiello, 
2013) indicated most analysis had been undertaken at high voltage levels, and that most 
studies were topological, with a small number also incorporating power flow models. 
Network models have been used to consider disruption to flows as a result of natural hazard 
damage (Holden et al., 2013), to investigate interdependencies between gas and electricity 
infrastructure (Ouyang et al., 2009a), and to investigate vulnerability of electricity 
infrastructure (Wang et al., 2012). Network models were also used to model communication, 
power and transport outage in New York, in order to evaluate temporary mitigation methods 
(Lee et al., 2007). Vulnerability analysis using a standard IEEE-300 electricity network and 
graph theory showed a similar disturbance size and impact for random node removal and 
targeted node removal (Sanchez, 2009). This is contradicted by (Pagani and Aiello, 2013), 
where topological analysis using graph theory showed connectivity of electrical systems was 
more severely affected by targeted node removal, compared with random node removal. 
Theoretical analysis of two interdependent networks using graph theory showed that node 
removal in one network led to percolation of further node removal in the two interconnected 
networks (Buldyrev et al., 2010). Graph theory has also been used model theoretical links 
between electricity, gas, heat and communications network components (de Durana et al., 
2014, Derksen et al., 2012, Svendsen and Wolthusen, 2007). 
These graph or network models are quite different to electricity network models which 
electrical engineers traditionally use to determine steady state and dynamic power flows. 
Traditional network power flow analysis can be used to analyse the consequences of a 
contingency or event on the electricity network. Combined with a probability of occurrence, 
the consequence of disconnected load with regards duration and extent can result in an 
estimate of risk analysis for the electricity sector. This method was used to determine the risk 
of loss of electricity supply for an ICT provider, shops, a train station and others for a case 
study area in Oslo (Kjølle et al., 2012). 
 
GRAPH THEORY 
Suppose we have two infrastructures, A and B. Components of each infrastructure can be 
represented by nodes (A1-A5, B1-B5 for example), and connections between components 
can be represented by edges. Figure 1 shows such a network. In three places, the two 
infrastructures are connected (A1-B1, A3-B3 and A5-B5). We can assume that these 
connections are necessary for infrastructure B to operate. This is typical of electricity 
infrastructure A and water infrastructure B, where some nodes of the water infrastructure B 
require power for pumping, for example. 
If infrastructure A experiences a failure or attack at node 3, node A3 and associated 
connections to infrastructure A and B are lost. This is shown in Figure 2. Because 
infrastructure A and B are connected, and assuming nodes of infrastructure B are inoperable 
if connection is lost to infrastructure A, node B3 and associated connections to infrastructure 
A and B are lost, as shown in Figure 3. 
As a result of the failure/attack, infrastructure A is split into two clusters (A1-A2 and A4-A5) 
with no direct links between them. Infrastructure B is a larger single cluster (B1-B2-B4-B5). 
Graph theory can therefore be used to consider the number of clusters created and the 
connectivity of the graph in order to identify how sensitive particular infrastructure networks 
are to failure, attack and interdependence. 
 
 Figure 1. Graph of two infrastructures (A and B) with 5 nodes each. 
 
Figure 2. Initial failure or attack on infrastructure A at node 3, connections lost. 
 Figure 3. Infrastructure B at node 3 reliant on A3, and so also fails, connections lost. 
Graph theory uses nodes and edges to represent networks. These can be physical networks, 
such as the electricity and water infrastructure example discussed above. The networks can 
also be of organisations or individuals, and the connections between them.  
Graph theory shall be used as the method for analysis and visualisation of the organisations 
and relationships involved in housing retrofit. By graphical representation of retrofit 
relationships, critical organisations and critical relationships can be identified. Preliminary 
results of this stage of work are presented. 
Further work will use graph theory to visualise the impact of failure of the electricity network 
for built environment professionals, to better understand the value of electricity networks in 
day to day operation of a city. 
 
ANALYSIS OF INFRASTRUCTURE INTERACTIONS 
Method 
This work intends to visualise perceived organisational networks needed for effective 
housing retrofit, where the focus of the retrofit is on energy efficiency and carbon emissions 
saving. 
The method is based on work which used graph theory to visualise mental maps of subjective 
realities of climate change (Reckien et al., 2012).  
Interviews were conducted in the North East of England with three groups of stakeholders: 
 Planners: Local Authority officers responsible for energy and climate change issues 
 Social Housing Provider employees responsible for housing retrofit 
 Goods and services providers involved in direct implementation of housing energy 
efficiency retrofit (i.e. members of the supply chain) 
It can be expected that interviewees draw on previous experience to address interview 
questions, but that no temporal information can be drawn from the response. The response is 
entirely subjective since the purpose of the interview is to draw out the interviewee’s 
perception of housing retrofit and infrastructure interaction. 
Participants were asked a key question.  “Thinking about planning and implementing a 
retrofit programme for domestic properties in <area relevant to respondent>, which 
organisations would you deal with?”. The interviewee was asked to brainstorm a range of 
organisations, to put these onto post-it notes, and to arrange these on a sheet with connections 
drawn between them. The connections represent relationships, and interviewees were asked 
to assign a weighting to relationships using a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 indicated an 
unimportant relationship between organisation X and organisation Y and 10 indicated a very 
important relationship between organisation X and organisation Y. As a result, the 
respondents created a mind map of energy efficiency retrofit organisations and the 
relationships between them. 
The data collection is partially completed. Results from the initial four interviews are 
analysed and presented below. 
Data analysis 
Interviewees may use different wording for the same ideas, making comparison between 
results difficult. Following a Grounded Theory approach, the organisations brainstormed as a 
result of the question shall be coded into a uniform terminology. This enables comparison 
between interviewee responses. Due to the small number of interviews held, the coding was 
undertaken in excel rather than a more specialist package like MaxQDA. The frequency of 
occurrence of organisations into the master group provides an indication of their perceived 
importance, as does the number of respondents (of the initial four) who identified 
organisations in the category. The resulting ten nodes in the master group are shown in   
 Table 1. 
  
 Table 1. Master group of nodes. 
Node 
number 
Node name No. of respondents 
referring to this 
organisation  
Frequency of 
occurrence 
1 Planning/project management role 4 6 
2 Internal specialist expertise 3 9 
3 Installing organisation 4 5 
4 Green Deal organisation 3 4 
5 Energy company 4 4 
6 Funding organisation 3 5 
7 Other projects 3 4 
8 External specialist expertise 4 13 
9 Technologies supplier 3 3 
10 Owner/tenant relations 3 7 
 
Not all respondents listed organisations in all ten categories. However, recoding the responses 
using these ten categories led to simplification of the network of organisations, for all 
respondents. In two cases, 17 organisations were simplified to 10, for one respondent 17 
organisations were simplified to 8, and for a fourth respondent 9 organisations were 
simplified to 7. An example mind map for one respondent is shown in Figure 1, showing an 
initial 17 organisations (nodes) and 33 relationships (edges). 
 
Figure 1. Respondent 3’s original mind map. 
Respondents were asked to identify relationships between organisations, and give a weighting 
to the strength of the relationship. Once the number of organisations had been simplified to 
ten categories, the relationships were recoded. Where a relationship was identified between 
two organisations which had been recoded into the same category (i.e. planning role and 
project management role), then the relationship was removed. Where a relationship between 
two categories was duplicated, then one relationship was retained with a strength which was 
the average of all duplicates. In this way, the number of relationships in the mind map was 
simplified for all respondents. This is shown in Table 2. A total of 31 unique relationships 
between the 10 organisations were identified by the 4 respondents. The 31 edges are 
described in Table 3, where the edge label refers to the starting node and ending node for that 
edge. An example for respondent 3 is shown in Figure 2, showing a simplified mind map of 
10 organisations (nodes) and 17 relationships (edges).  
 
Table 2. Reduction in the number of organisations and relationships resulting from data 
analysis. 
Respondent Pre-analysis 
number of 
organisations 
(nodes) 
Post-analysis 
number of 
organisations 
(nodes) 
Pre-analysis 
number of 
relationships 
(edges) 
Post-analysis 
number of 
relationships 
(edges) 
1 17 8 30 16 
2 9 7 10 7 
3 17 10 33 17 
4 17 10 27 18 
 
Table 3. Master group of edges. 
Edge 
number 
Edge 
weight 
Edge 
label 
Edge 
number 
Edge 
weight 
Edge 
label 
Edge 
number 
Edge 
weight 
Edge 
label 
1 8.67 1-2 11 9.00 2-4 21 8.00 3-10 
2 9.80 1-3 12 3.00 2-5 22 7.50 4-5 
3 8.50 1-4 13 3.00 2-6 23 9.00 4-7 
4 4.25 1-5 14 9.00 2-8 24 9.50 4-9 
5 7.67 1-6 15 8.00 2-10 25 7.13 4-10 
6 5.60 1-7 16 5.00 3-5 26 4.00 5-8 
7 4.42 1-8 17 7.00 3-6 27 6.00 5-9 
8 5.00 1-9 18 9.00 3-7 28 6.00 6-9 
9 7.50 1-10 19 8.00 3-8 29 10.00 7-8 
10 8.50 2-3 20 9.17 3-9 30 5.00 8-9 
      
31 6.50 8-10 
 
 Figure 2. Respondent 3’s simplified mind map. 
 
In order to visualise the mind maps from the results, Network Workbench (NBS Team, 2006) 
was used. Nodes represented organisations, with a size which represents the frequency of 
occurrence for all respondents. Edges represent connections and relationships, with a label 
which represents the mean weighting across all respondents. The created mental map, in the 
form of a weighted graph, can then be analysed using descriptors such as the degree of nodes 
and betweenness of nodes. This analysis will enable a robust evaluation of key concepts and 
organisations in the mind maps created. Based on the initial interviews, a mind map is shown 
in Figure 3. A further simplification of the mind map was undertaken, to remove all edges 
with a value below 7 (i.e. to remove the less important relationships). This mind map with 
reduced edges is shown in Figure 4. The degree and betweenness for the nodes is shown in 
Table 4. This analysis indicates that the key organisations which respondents considered most 
crucial to housing retrofit were the planning/project management role, the internal specialist 
expertise, the installing organisation, the Green Deal organisation and the external expertise.  
 Figure 3. Merged mind map showing 10 nodes and 31 edges (weightings of edges 
labelled). 
 
Table 4. Degree and betweenness of nodes, will all edges and with reduced edges. 
Node 
number 
Node name Degree (all 
edges)  
Betweenness 
(all edges) 
Degree 
(reduced 
edges) 
Betweenness 
(reduced 
edges) 
1 Planning/project 
management role 
9 7.233 4 1.6 
2 Internal specialist 
expertise 
7 3.399 5 5.6 
3 Installing organisation 8 5.899 7 26.666 
4 Green Deal organisation 6 3.233 6 22.666 
5 Energy company 6 0.999 1 0 
6 Funding organisation 4 0.333 1 0 
7 Other projects 4 0.666 3 3.599 
8 External specialist 
expertise 
7 3.233 3 0.666 
9 Technologies supplier 6 2.333 2 1.6 
10 Owner/tenant relations 5 0.666 4 1.6 
 
 
 Figure 4. Merged mind map with reduced edges. 
 
Housing retrofit is seen as vital to the delivery of reductions in CO2 emissions for the UK. As 
described in the introduction, in order for the UK to meet targets for reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions, future energy scenarios include:  
 decarbonisation of heating energy demand through reduced use of gas-fired boilers 
and increased use of technologies such as solar thermal and air source heat pumps; 
 decarbonisation of transport energy demand through reduced use of internal 
combustion engines and increased use of electric vehicles (EVs), plug-in hybrid 
electric vehicles (PHEVs) and fuel cell vehicles; 
 increased use of small scale electricity generation technologies such as photovoltaics. 
These proposed changes will affect the way in which we use energy in the home, and in 
particular the way in which we use electricity. 
The results shown here indicate that the energy company was perceived as having a relatively 
minor role to play in retrofit. The energy company had a relatively low level of degree and 
betweenness. Once less critical relationships were removed, the energy company only had a 
key relationship with the Green Deal organisation.  
  
SUMMARY 
Using graph theory, relationships between key organisations involved in energy efficiency 
housing retrofits were investigated. The method for data gathering was face-to-face 
interviews with three groups of built environment professionals, and further data gathering is 
ongoing. Preliminary results were represented using graph theory, for visual and analytical 
analysis of perceptions of organisations and the importance of the relationships between 
them. Results showed that key organisations, which respondents consider most crucial to 
housing retrofit, are the planning/project management role, the internal specialist expertise, 
the installing organisation, the Green Deal organisation and the external expertise. The 
energy company was perceived as having a relatively minor role to play in retrofit. If the 
energy company remains peripheral to housing retrofit moving forward, then energy 
infrastructure providers in particular will find it more difficult to manage the infrastructure in 
a proactive, rather than reactive, way. 
An improved understanding of organisations and relationships involved in energy efficiency 
housing retrofit can then be used to investigate, for those organisations which are more 
central to the process, why they are perceived as such. It can also be a tool to identify the 
organisations which are most appropriate for targeted training and information, to ensure 
delivery of targets such as carbon reduction, and to maximise uptake of new technologies 
such as air source heat pumps. 
Future work shall involve application of the network model to investigate interaction impacts 
of future scenarios for built environment electricity use. 
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